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Does Cost Sharing really Reduce Inappropriate 
Prescriptions? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores different empirical strategies to examine the effect of cost sharing for 
prescription drugs in some dimensions of medication-related quality, namely the probability 
of inappropriate prescription drug use among United States seniors. Using data from 1996 to 
2005, we explore various specifications that correct for sample selection, endogeneity¸ and 
unobserved heterogeneity. We find a small, but measurable, negative price elasticity for 
inappropriate drug use with respect to self-reported average out-of-pocket costs for all drugs 
consumed. That is, user fees reduce the use of potentially inappropriate medications, however 
the elasticity of cost sharing is lower than that of drugs in general and the price elasticity is 
relatively close to zero, suggesting that any quality improvements from co-payments are 
small. 
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1. Introduction 
As prescription drugs comprised 14.7% of total health care spending growth in the US 
from 1994-2004 (KFF, 2006a), third-party payers have increasingly emphasized 
demand-side cost sharing as a tool to shift pharmaceutical expenditures to patients1. 
Examples of current initiatives include the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act (KFF, 2006b), 
which allows states to charge Medicaid beneficiaries higher co-payments for 
prescription drugs and multi-tier formularies under private insurance plans (Huskamp 
et al., 2003), which steer beneficiaries toward cheaper therapeutic alternatives. 
Although appreciable cost savings might arise from mitigating insurance risk 
selection and promoting efficient treatments, user fees may also reduce the 
consumption of both appropriate and inappropriate drug treatments, potentially 
affecting health care quality2. While attention has been devoted to the effect of cost 
sharing on overall prescription drug use (Gemmill et al., 2008, Rice and Matsuoka 
(2004) and/or Gibson et al. (2005)), little is known about the relationship between 
prescription drug cost sharing and the quality of care, particularly measured through 
consumption of inappropriate medications3. It is important for policymakers to be 
aware of any unintended and suboptimal consequences of increased cost sharing, 
namely the proliferation of inappropriate prescriptions. In this paper we define 
inappropriate prescriptions as medications that entail more potential risks than 
                                                 
1 In this particular study we adopt a broad definition of cost sharing, which covers all types of out-of-
pocket expenditures and may include co-payments, coinsurance, deductibles, prescription limits, tiered 
co-payments, and other mechanisms to monitor consumer demand.  
2Quality can be defined as the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase 
the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge 
(Lohr, 1990). 
3 Indeed, a decrease in consumption of inappropriate drug is taken to be an improvement in quality, yet 
rather than focusing on appropriate modifications we examine inappropriate dimensions of quality one.  
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benefits (Beers et al., 1991) or alternatively, medications that are prescribed contrary 
to accepted medical standards. 
 
Given that inappropriate prescriptions ultimately diminish the quality of the health 
care system and may increase overall health expenditures, this is an important issue to 
address empirically. As pointed out by the Institute of Medicine (2006), medication 
errors are surprisingly common and undoubtedly costly to patients, their families, 
employers, hospitals, health-care providers, and insurance companies.  
 
Although the quality of care is pertinent to all groups of the population, the elderly are 
of particular interest given the nature of their illnesses, the therapeutic effects of 
medications, and the costs of medicating this population. The elderly are a visible 
health target as they account for more than 30% of all prescription drug expenditures 
in the US while only comprising 13% of the population (Higashi et al., 2004). Poor 
medication-related quality of care can potentially harm a significant portion of the 
elderly and decrease the efficacy of health care (Hanlon et al., 2001). The elderly are 
more likely to experience multiple health problems, and the use of numerous 
medications, regardless of age, increases the risk of adverse drug reactions4 (ADEs), 
although aspects of the aging process also increase the risk of these events (Gurwitz 
and Avorn, 1991)5. During the diagnosis and treatment of ADEs, individuals may 
incur out-of-pocket expenses and lose valuable time, while third-party payers may 
incur significant costs, particularly if the individual is hospitalized.  
 
                                                 
4 Adverse drug events (ADEs) are as noxious and unintended reactions caused by a medication. 
5 Examples include a reduction in hepatitic blood flow and liver size, increased body fat at the expense 
of lean body mass, and other age-related changes that may alter the pharmacokinetic and 
pharmacodynamic properties of drugs. 
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To date there are few studies that have investigated the impact of insurance coverage 
or cost sharing on the quality of care, and few studies have examined the behavioral 
processes that lead to inappropriate prescribing from a physician and consumer 
perspective. Most studies either use one cross section or have exploratory or 
experimental aims but do not attempt to estimate the specific functional form of the 
process, even as a reduced form. Analyses seldom consider possible biases such as the 
potential endogeneity of insurance, selection issues, and unobservables behind the 
demand for health care.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether the level of cost sharing 
for prescription drugs influences the consumption of inappropriate medications. 
Following form economic theory, a patient consumes a drug if the user cost of the 
drug is lower the (perceived) marginal benefit (MB).  The MB of each of 
inappropriate medication is negative.  Hence, people should not consume these drugs 
even if they were free.  However, individuals or their agents (doctors) might not be 
aware of the inappropriateness of some medications, and hence an increase in user 
cost might exert unexpected – both positive and negative- effects on the utilization of 
inappropriate prescriptions. 
 
Drawing from an empirical model that contains information on individual needs and 
characteristics, we estimate the prevalence of inappropriate consumption among 
elderly Americans by focusing on 33 frequently prescribed molecules for which 
clinical guidelines suggest that their effect on elderly patients is of a questionable 
nature and constitutes poor quality of care. This is a conservative (narrow) definition 
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to capture “basic” dimension of quality6. We use the most recent unbalanced panel 
data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and test for potential biases 
such as sample selection, an endogenenous co-payment variable, and unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the conceptual 
framework and briefly summarizes the existing literature on the area. Section 3 
discusses the data and empirical strategy, and Section 4 describes the results of our 
analysis. Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.   
 
2. Related Literature and Background 
The process whereby a patient receives an inappropriate medication begins when the 
patient experiences a health shock and the physician determines the most adequate 
treatment based on an observation of the patient’s health status and the severity of 
illness. By choosing the physician as his agent, the patient intends for the physician to 
make treatment decisions which maximize his utility. The patient then purchases a 
prescribed medication based on the out-of-pocket price, a budget restriction (income), 
and other intangible costs (such as time spent at the pharmacy and perceptions of 
medication side effects). Whether the chosen drug is appropriate is determined jointly 
with the prescription drug decision.  
 
The appropriateness of a prescription drug can be conceptualized as a specific quality 
dimension of drug treatment, and we explore two competing hypothesis. First, from a 
health care consumer perspective, in the doctor-patient agency relationship the 
                                                 
6 Alternative definition could counter-indications and account for co-morbidities.    
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physician compares the marginal benefit of a medication for a specific condition 
against the marginal benefits of alternative treatments. The physician might take the 
patient’s financial situation into consideration, but the physician’s own utility and the 
third-party payer’s utility are also likely to play a role. For each prescribed 
medication, the patient then makes a marginal net benefit comparison, foregoing 
medications where the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit. Given that an 
inappropriate medication has a poor safety it profile; inappropriate medications should 
yield none or a lower marginal net benefit than other more appropriate medications. 
Hence, holding the prices of all medications constant, the patient should be more 
likely to forego an inappropriate medication (in this case assuming the patient 
correctly values the marginal net benefit). A second possibility is the ‘quality 
hypothesis’ which posits that an inverse relationship between the level of cost sharing 
and the quality of medical care provided exists (Wong et al., 2001). The intuition is 
that patients are unable to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate 
medications and when faced with greater out-of-pocket costs, they opt for lower-
priced substitutes, which are more likely to be of lower quality7. The latter has been 
found for inpatient or outpatient care but limited evidence exists in the case of drugs.  
 
As discussed above, the elderly are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of 
inappropriate prescriptions, although the determinants and side effects are different 
for the elderly residing in nursing homes and other institutional settings than for those 
who obtain their medications from office-based physicians or outpatient settings. As 
our sample consists of the non-institutionalized elderly, a less frail group of the 
population, only the results of the literature which examine the non-institutionalized 
                                                 
7 Additionally, the physician may be a poor agent for the patient by substituting lower-priced 
inappropriate medications for the patient. As a result, the quantity of inappropriate medications 
demanded increases. 
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individuals who obtain their medications from office-based physicians or outpatient 
settings will be discussed here. The literature has found that being female (Aparasu 
and Fliginger, 1997; Goulding, 2004; Willcox et al., 1994; Zhan et al., 2001), married 
(Hanlon et al., 2002), and in poor health (Hanlon et al., 2002; Willcox et al., 1994; 
Zhan et al., 2001) are associated with a greater likelihood of receiving an 
inappropriate medication. Mixed results were found for age (Aparasu and Fliginger, 
1997; Goulding, 2004; Hanlon et al., 2002; Mort and Aparasu, 2000), race/ethnicity 
(Aparasu and Fliginger, 1997; Hanlon et al., 2002; Zhan et al., 2001), and Medicaid 
status (Aparasu and Fliginger, 1997; Mort and Aparasu, 2000; Willcox et al., 1994).  
 
Other studies have considered changes in the use of discretionary medications among 
individuals of various ages. Data from the RAND experiment (Foxman et al., 1987), 
which looked at non-elderly participants across six sites in the US, indicated that 
individuals with higher coinsurance rates decreased their use of both effective and 
ineffective antibiotics. Using aggregate data from New Hampshire, Soumerai et al. 
(1987) determined that a limit on the number of reimbursable prescriptions, which is 
essentially 100% coinsurance, reduced the number of essential and discretionary 
medications obtained among low-income Medicaid recipients. McManus et al. (1996) 
found that among elderly Australians, the introduction of a $2.50 (Australian dollars) 
co-payment decreased both essential and discretionary prescriptions. These findings 
suggest that when considering a reduced form of the agency relationship, higher co-
payments are likely to reduce inappropriate prescription drug use.  
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3. Data and empirical strategy 
  3.1. Explicit criteria for inappropriate medication use 
Various medical experts have developed lists of medications considered inappropriate 
for the elderly. The Beers et al. (1991) investigation (known as the “Beers list”) 
convened a panel of thirteen nationally recognized medical experts to create a list of 
criteria for inappropriate medications using the Delphi technique. Because the Beers 
list was intended for the institutionalized elderly, typically the frailest in the 
population, later lists identified drugs that should be avoided by the community-
dwelling elderly (Fick et al., 2003; Zhan et al., 2001). While it is not possible to 
identify inappropriate medications in a dataset from the Beers list or the Fick et al. 
(2003) list, the Zhan et al. (2001) list is also based on a panel of medical experts and 
is the most conducive to empirical analysis. Although the existing lists attract critics 
because of the impossibility of capturing all factors that influence the effectiveness of 
prescriptions in the elderly (Anderson et al., 1997), the medical community generally 
accepts these criteria (Fick et al., 2003), and evidence suggests that these types of lists 
successfully predict ADEs in elderly outpatients (Chang et al., 2005). 
 
  3.2. Econometric Strategy 
To correct for various biases that could affect the results, we followed an evolving 
econometric strategy and investigated several specifications. The first specification 
entails a reduced form of the drug consumption decision through a simple probit 
regression conditioned upon positive prescription use8. Alternative specifications 
allow us to deal with potential selection bias, endogeneity, and unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
                                                 
8 MEPS is designed as a rotating sample, and thus the repeated sampling of individuals in the sample 
merits the use of clustering to adjust the standard errors 
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The initial specification accounts for the non-linearity of the data through a simple 
two-part probit (Wooldridge, 2002):  
iiii vXXIE +γ=)(   *Ii II =  for 1=iD                                (1) 
    iI  is not observed for 0=iD  
iiii uZZDE +α=)(                                       (2). 
The variables from equations (1) and (2) represent the following: iI  is a binary 
indicator of inappropriate drug use which we don’t fully observe (I*) and we assume 
is proxied by the variable we constructed, iX  are the explanatory variables that 
explain iI  and return coefficients γ , and iv  is the error term. In equation (2) iD  is 
the binary indicator of prescription drug use, iZ  are the covariates that explain iD  
and return coefficients α , while iu  is the error term. Given that we assume a normal 
distribution, the probit model specifies the following conditional probabilities for 
equations (1) and (2), respectively: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∫
γ
∞−
ϕ=γΦ==
X
dXXXXIp 1      (3) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∫
γ
∞−
ϕ=γΦ==
Z
dZZZZDp 1      (4), 
where )(⋅Φ  refers to the standard cumulative distribution function. 
 
An important aspect of our analysis is the unbalanced panel nature of the data, which 
allows us to consider some cross-sectional time variability in the data. To account for 
repeated observations and considering asymptotic theory in the presence of a large 
number of clusters and small cluster sizes (Wooldridge, 2006), the model can be 
rewritten as: 
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igtgigtigtigt vcZZIE ++γ=)(                                      (5) 
igtgigtigtigt ukXXDE ++α=)(                                     (6). 
where igtZ  and igtX  are the individual-specific determinants of inappropriate drug use 
and positive prescription use that may differ over time, gc  and gk  are the unobserved 
cluster effects, and igtv  and igtu  are the idiosyncratic disturbance terms. Failing to 
account for the individual-specific error term in each equation may mean that the 
error terms ( )itg vc +  and ( )itg uk +  are correlated among observations within clusters, 
and there may also be temporal heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. The use of cluster 
regression allows us to differentiate the between- and within-cluster regression effects 
affecting the standard errors for intra-group correlation (Wooldridge, 2006). 
Therefore, the variance matrices were adjusted to make the estimations robust, 
implying that the model is defined as follows: 
)(),1( gigtgigtigt cZcZIP +γΦ==                        (7) 
)(),1( gigtgigtigt kXkXDP +αΦ==                        (8). 
 
Given that other aspects of the data could be biasing the results, it is important to 
explore alternative specifications. Following Wooldridge (2002) and Heckman 
(1979), a potential concern is sample selection as we only observe inappropriate 
prescription use for a limited sample. To correct for this potential bias, one 
specification we consider is a Heckman approach that accounts for the binary nature 
of both the participation and outcome variables (Heckit). As mentioned before, 
another potential bias is endogeneity because unobserved variables such as the quality 
of insurance coverage could be correlated with both the consumption of inappropriate 
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medications and the co-payment rate. Again following Wooldridge (2002), we correct 
for endogeneity using an instrumental variables approach. A third possibility is that of 
unobserved heterogeneity. We take advantage of repeated sampling through the use of 
a fixed effects estimator as it may be important to control for unobserved individual-
specific factors. 
 
  3.3. The data 
For the analysis we use the 1996-2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, a 
nationally representative sample of the US civilian, non-institutionalized population 
with a degree of over sampling of Hispanics and blacks (AHRQ, 2007). Each year, 
data is collected from a new sample of households, which creates overlapping panels 
of survey data. Individuals under the age of 65 were excluded as Medicare, the public 
health insurance program for the elderly, establishes 65 as the eligibility threshold, 
and the inappropriate drug lists discussed above are intended for this population. The 
raw data consisted of 306,238 observations, and after removing individuals under the 
age of 65 (272,711 observations) and excluding observations with missing data (783 
observations), the final sample consisted of 32,744 observations9. Of these 32,744 
observations, 14,297 individuals were sampled twice. 
 
There is no explicit variable for the co-payment in MEPS, although the survey does 
contain information about the individual’s out-of-pocket pharmaceutical expenditures 
and the total number of prescriptions (including initial prescriptions and refills) 
purchased in a given year. We subsequently computed an average annual co-payment 
variable by dividing the respondent’s annual out-of-pocket drug expenditures by his 
                                                 
9 All of these totals include both observations for individuals that appeared twice in MEPS. Note that 
individuals in the MEPS sample can at most be sampled twice. 
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total drug consumption. Although this variable proxies the co-payment as individuals 
face deductibles, coverage limits, or out-of-pocket maximums, it is an indicator of the 
average generosity of the respondent’s prescription drug coverage. Copayment are to 
an extent choice variable to instrument given that individuals choose insurance option 
on that basis, and accordingly expectations of out of pocket expenditure as a 
proportion of total expenditure. Similarly,  when in some of the drugs, generics are 
available, different insurance policies adopt different policies to substitute drugs by 
cheaper generics, which explains difference in effective cost sharing. This is a similar 
idea as the one used in Wang et al (2007) where they call this, the proportion of the 
annual drug cost paid by the insurance plan, which acts as a proxy for  insurance plan 
cost sharing with patients.  
  
3.4. The variables 
The dependent variable was constructed from criteria published in the literature. The 
Zhan et al. (2001) list contained 33 medications (Table A1 in the Appendix) that were 
considered inappropriate regardless of dosage, frequency of administration, or 
duration, and based on this list; we constructed a dependent variable that indicated 
whether the patient had obtained at least 1 of the 33 medications listed as 
inappropriate for the elderly.  These conditions are reasonable measure of  
prescription drug appropriateness using data from the period employed.    
 
The main treatment variable for the analysis was the co-payment. Given the usual 
negative relationship between price and quantity, we might expect a higher co-
payment to reduce the demand for inappropriate medications. An alternative scenario 
is that the price is a signal of quality and the patient may substitute medications of 
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lower quality when faced with higher co-payments, increasing the demand for 
inappropriate medications. 
 
Age can have an ambiguous effect on inappropriate prescriptions. On the one hand, 
age increases the depreciation rate of an individual’s health stock, increasing the need 
for prescription drugs (Grossman, 1999), including inappropriate prescription drugs. 
On the other hand, elderly individuals are more at risk for adverse drug reactions, and 
doctors may be less apt to prescribe drugs that could be potentially inappropriate in 
these individuals. Similarly, gender is important as men and women face different 
prevalences of specific conditions such as cardiovascular disease. Women may also 
invest more in health because of greater risk aversion. Regarding ethnicity, non-white 
individuals tend to live in poorer areas where health care may be of lower quality, and 
their physicians may be less informed about the appropriateness of particular 
prescriptions. As for marital status, married individuals may be less likely to receive 
an unsuitable drug because one spouse may scrutinize the medications that the other 
receives.  
 
Other treatment variables that result from the agency relationship are the individual’s 
socio-economic status (measuring ability to pay) and health status (capturing health 
need). Disposable income is an important determinant in that more affluent 
individuals may be willing to pay higher prices for medication-related quality. There 
might also be a relationship between income and access to higher quality medical care 
if the physicians of wealthier individuals are more knowledgeable of suitable 
medications. In line with the income variable, individuals with more education may 
be more informed about inappropriate medications or may be more likely to have 
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conversations with their physicians regarding the appropriateness of their medication 
regimes. Urban area may convey information on access to certain medications and the 
information that physicians and patients have on the value of treatments.  
 
In terms of health variables, we account for the severity of the patient’s health 
conditions along with reported health status. Individuals who are in poor health, have 
been diagnosed with one of the leading causes of death, or who face at least one 
limitation to an activity of daily living are more likely to have a condition that can be 
treated by a potentially inappropriate medicine and thus have a greater chance of 
receiving one of these prescriptions. Similarly, severity is used to tests whether it 
affects co-payments.  
 
Finally, it is important to include time controls as the rate of inappropriate 
medications may be naturally declining over time, although in part that can be 
attributed to the fact that over time medications become older and are substituted by 
new ones.  
 
4. Results 
  4.1. Descriptive evidence 
The descriptive statistics (Table 1) reveal that the average co-payment was $22.39 (in 
1996 dollars), and the average age of a respondent was 74.38. Most respondents were 
female (59.9%), and a little over half (52.1%) of the sample was married. Blacks and 
Hispanics each made up about 12% of the sample, while only 3.1% of the sample was 
of another race or ethnicity. The average annual disposable income was $16,991 (in 
1996 dollars). About 45% of the sample had a high school degree, while an additional 
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19% had received education above a high school degree. Around 75% of the sample 
lived in an urban area. While 8.2% of the sample was in poor health, 19.2% was in 
fair health, and 32.9% was in good health. About 38% of respondents had been 
diagnosed with one of the leading causes of death, and 8.3% of individuals faced at 
least one limitation to an activity of daily living. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 also contains information on the percentage of the sample that obtained at 
least one prescription and the percentage of the sample with at least one inappropriate 
prescription (conditioned upon already having a prescription). While most of the 
sample had obtained at least one prescription, there were more differences regarding 
inappropriate prescriptions. One interesting observation was that a higher percentage 
of females had obtained an inappropriate prescription. Additionally, the use of 
inappropriate prescriptions seemed to decline with income, and those in poor health 
were more likely to obtain this type of medication. Also, the prevalence of 
inappropriate medications decreased over time. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We also graphed the annual prevalence of inappropriate prescriptions for the entire 
elderly sample (Figure 1). The graph reveals that inappropriate prescriptions declined 
from 1996 to 1998, with a large drop in 1999. Since then inappropriate prescription 
use has declined somewhat.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
  4.2. Simple econometric specification 
A number of different specifications for the model were tested, and the results of 
these specifications are listed in Tables 3-4. Clustering was used to account for 
repeated observations. An important consideration was the non-observability of 
inappropriate prescriptions for respondents that did not consume any prescription 
medications during a given year. To account for this occurrence, we employed a two-
part model, although we did consider the possibility of sample selection bias. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first model (Table 3) was a simple two-part probit that did not account for any 
potential biases such as sample selection, endogeneity, or unobserved heterogeneity. 
Based on the simple probit model, the predicted probability of an average individual 
in the sample obtaining an inappropriate prescription was 19.23%. For the co-
payment variable, the sign was negative and significant, and the associated price 
elasticity of demand was –0.030 (p=0.009). The results of the other variables 
indicated that age exhibited a significant and negative effect, while males were 5.9% 
less likely than females to receive an inappropriate medication. Compared with being 
unmarried, married individuals were less likely to receive an inappropriate 
prescription, although this was only significant at the 10% level. Blacks and Hispanics 
were 2.4% and 4.3% less likely than whites to receive an inappropriate medication, 
although the result for individuals of other races or ethnicities was not significant.  
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Income was also an important predictor with an income elasticity of –0.020 
(p=0.040). Education was less important, with neither education variable being 
significant. In terms of location, those who lived in an urban area experienced a lower 
likelihood of obtaining an inappropriate medication.  
 
As we would expect from the agency framework, health status plays an important role 
in the quality of care. Perhaps the most alarming result was that respondents who 
reported being in poor health were 15.6% more likely to receive an inappropriate 
medication than those in very good or excellent health. The trend was less dramatic 
for individuals in fair or good health. Finally, the year variables were generally 
significant and decreasing over time. 
 
  4.3. Alternative econometric specifications 
Given the potential for biases from sample selection, endogeneity, and/or unobserved 
heterogeneity, it is important to consider alternative specifications for inappropriate 
medication use10. Table 4 lists the coefficients and standard errors from three different 
models: (i) a sample selection model that conditions inappropriate medication use on 
positive prescription consumption, (ii) an instrumental variables probit to account for 
the potential endogeneity of the co-payment variable, and (iii) a fixed effects probit. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
10 One particular effect is that of disentangling the individual’s willingness to pay for drugs (e.g. the 
propensity of the patient to purchase expensive innovative drugs or therapeutic products that are not 
covered by insurance schemes) form cost sharing.  
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The first model considered a selection correction. While the null hypothesis of 
selection (that ρ=0) is rejected at the 5% level, it is worth noting that the coefficient 
on the co-payment variable is only slightly larger in magnitude to the coefficient 
under the simple probit specification11. The coefficients on the other variables are also 
relatively similar to the coefficients in the simple probit model. Given that only 10.4% 
of the sample did not consume any prescriptions during the entire period (1996-2005), 
it is unlikely that there is much bias from the non-observability of inappropriate use 
among those that do not consume any medications. Thus, there seems to be little 
reason to prefer the sample selection specification over the simple two-part probit. 
 
The second model in Table 4 is an instrumental variables probit to account for the 
potential endogeneity of the co-payment variable. In searching for instruments we 
considered sources of variation in the co-payment variable that were theoretically 
relevant and empirically valid. One potential institutional instrument lies in the 
fragmentation of US insurance coverage. The non-linearity of the co-payment 
variable (due to differing deductibles, co-payments, etc.) also implies that we can only 
obtain an average co-payment, and accordingly, controlling for different consumption 
patterns is important. Because of these possibilities, we considered a number of 
instruments, but the two strongest were: the Gini coefficient for the primary sampling 
unit (psu) within which the elderly respondent resided and whether the respondent had 
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. The first instrument, the Gini 
coefficient within the psu, was a measure of the inequality within the area where each 
individual resided. Wealthier groups are likely have more generous health insurance 
                                                 
11 Note that because of the unobservability of the co-payment variable for individuals with no 
prescription drug consumption in a given year, we did not include the co-payment variable in the first-
stage of the Heckit approach. As an alternative specification, we predicted the non-observable values of 
the co-payment variable using the standard Heckman approach, and the results barely changed and the 
difference in coefficients was not statistically significant. 
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coverage such that a high Gini coefficient likely correlates with lower co-payments. 
Not surprisingly, the coefficient on this variable was negative and significant 
(p=0.001) as a predictor of the co-payment. The second instrument, whether the 
individual had employer-sponsored insurance, was expected to indicate more 
generous prescription drug coverage in comparison to those with other forms of 
private insurance or no insurance. As expected, the coefficient on this variable was 
negative and significant (p=0.000) as a predictor of the co-payment. The instruments 
meet the traditional conditions of validity and relevance. As for the former, we find 
that neither of the instruments was a significant predictor of inappropriate prescription 
drug use (p=0.114 for the Gini coefficient variable, and p=0.643 for the employer 
union health insurance variable). According to the Sargan test for overidentification, 
we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments were not independent 
of the error term in the main equation (p=0.097). Furthermore, an F-test for weak 
instrument instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997) was significantly high at F=81.81. 
 
Based on two different specification tests, we could not reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity. The value of the Wald test was ( )12χ =0.14 (p=0.708), while the Smith-
Blundell test yielded a value of ( )12χ =0.263 (p=0.608). In any case, most of the 
variables do not change significantly under the IV specification, with the exception of 
the co-payment variable, which increases slightly in magnitude and becomes 
insignificant. Overall, it appears that an instrumental variables specification is not 
appropriate for the chosen outcome variable in this study. 
 
A third specification that we considered was a fixed effects approach. A number of 
time-invariant variables did not return coefficients, and these were excluded from the 
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model. The Hausman test for a fixed effects versus a pooled specification indicated 
that a fixed effects specification was more appropriate ( 2χ (19)=37.80, p=0.006), 
while the Hausman test for a fixed effects versus a random effects specification also 
indicated that a fixed effects model was more appropriate ( 2χ (19)=87.45, p=0.000). 
An interesting result from the fixed effects logit model is that the co-payment is 
positive but only significant at the 10% level. 
 
A problem with the fixed effects model is the loss of information. That is, this 
specification restricts the sample to individuals that have changed from having at least 
one inappropriate prescription to having none of the 33 inappropriate prescriptions or 
vice versa during the two years that the individual was in the sample. As a result, 
25,610 observations were dropped from the sample under this specification. Thus, if 
we want to consider only the “switchers” in the sample, this specification is useful; 
however, for policy purposes, where were are also interested in individuals who do 
not change their inappropriate prescription status, this specification is of less use. 
 
  4.4. Robustness checks 
As important as the specification of the model is a robustness check of the included 
predictors. Table 5 provides the price and income elasticity results for different 
combinations of covariates. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The robustness checks indicate that the price elasticity is about the same while the 
income elasticity is somewhat higher when only the main demographic variables are 
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included in the model. As more covariates are added, the co-payment fluctuates 
somewhat, with the largest drop in the price elasticity occurring when the year 
variables are added to model. Interestingly, the largest drop in the income elasticity 
occurs when the health variables are added to the model. We also tried other 
covariates such as whether the individual was retired and the mental health status of 
the beneficiary in the model, but none of these were significant. 
 
As an additional set of robustness checks, we included a number of interaction effects 
between the co-payment and health status, income and health status, the co-payment 
and income, and the co-payment and type of health insurance coverage12. The only 
significant interaction effect was the one between the co-payment and the type of 
insurance coverage. Table 6 lists the price elasticity results of including the 
interaction effect between health insurance coverage and the co-payment in the 
regression. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The interaction between the co-payment and public health insurance coverage yielded 
a price elasticity of –0.021, compared with a price elasticity of –0.029 for individuals 
with Medicare only. The interaction between the co-payment and beneficiaries with 
private insurance coverage was not significant, leaving a price elasticity of –0.029 for 
this group. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Because the sample is of those over the age of 64, all of the sample was eligible for Medicare 
coverage. Thus, we assume that all individuals in the sample at least have Medicare coverage. 
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5. Discussion 
This study has examined the relationship between cost sharing for prescription drugs 
and one relevant dimension of health care: quality. Given the potential for pitfalls 
such as selection bias, endogeneity, and unobserved heterogeneity, a number of 
different specifications were considered. The simple two-part probit model was 
identified as the preferred specification as the results generally did not change much 
across the sample selection correction and other robustness checks. The results are 
particularly relevant given that the factors which influence the quality of care are 
increasingly under scrutiny both in inpatient care (Picone et al., 2003) and in other 
sources of care such as pharmaceuticals.  
 
We find a small, but measurable, negative price elasticity for inappropriate drug use 
with respect to self-reported average out-of-pocket costs for all drugs consumed.  Put 
differently, older adults with higher levels of cost sharing for prescribed medicines 
were less likely to use drugs on the inappropriate list of drugs identified by the Beers 
(1991) process.  The hypothesized positive substitution effect is less than the negative 
income effect, suggesting that cost sharing could be a useful tool for encouraging 
appropriate use of prescribed medicines.  That is,  higher levels of prescription drug 
cost sharing actually decrease inappropriate drug use with a relatively inelastic price 
elasticity of demand of -0.024 (p=0.004). This result is in line with other studies in the 
literature which have found that higher cost sharing leads patients to decrease the use 
of both effective and ineffective medications (Foxman et al., 1987; Soumerai et al., 
1987). There are few estimates of the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs 
among the elderly. Coulson and Stuart (1995) found an elasticity of –0.34 for low-
income seniors in the US state of Pennsylvania, while Li et al. (2007) obtained price 
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elasticity values ranging from –0.20 to –0.11 for seniors with rheumatoid arthritis in 
British Columbia, Canada. The negative relationship between price and inappropriate 
drug use leads us to reject the ‘quality hypothesis’. However, the fact that our estimate 
of the price elasticity of demand for inappropriate drugs is lower than the price 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs in general is alarming. It implies that 
seniors are less likely to cut back on known inappropriate medications than other 
medications when faced with higher prices. Hence, the "quality hypothesis" argument 
connote be ruled out. Furthermore, if the agency relationship works two ways, one 
might argue that direct to consumer advertising might be responsible to senior 
pushing for inappropriate medication that are  heavily advertised.  
 
Interestingly, there were slight differences in the price elasticity of demand for 
inappropriate drugs between individuals with public insurance coverage and 
individuals with private insurance coverage or Medicare only. Beneficiaries with 
public insurance coverage were slightly less sensitive than beneficiaries with 
Medicare only to increases in the prices of inappropriate medications. The implication 
is that public programs, such as Medicaid, can do more to steer physicians and 
pharmacists away from prescribing and dispensing these medications. 
 
Furthermore, we find that the medication-related quality of care is a normal good, 
which may reflect the ability of more affluent individuals to obtain suitable 
information on their health-related conditions (Kenkel, 1991). Another possibility is 
that higher-income individuals obtain a higher quality of care through their physicians 
and thus receive fewer inappropriate prescriptions as a result. 
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Another finding was that inappropriate prescription use has been declining over time. 
It is possible that initiatives to curtail suboptimal prescribing and increase health care 
quality, such as drug utilization reviews and the publication of articles regarding these 
specific inappropriate prescriptions, occurred over the period. “Learning by doing” 
may also exist whereby new prescription drug information is disseminated 
heterogeneously among physicians over time, or physicians learn from previous 
mistakes and experience. A third explanation may be that physicians naturally switch 
patients to newer medications when these become available, as Newhouse (1992) 
argues that improvements in medical technologies and greater use of these 
technologies are the major drivers of health expenditure increases.  
 
The predicted prevalence of inappropriate drug use is also alarming. The two-part model 
predicts that from 1996 to 2005, an elderly individual had a 19% chance of being 
prescribed an inappropriate medication, although by 2004 this figure had dropped to 
about 17%. Both probabilities are relatively high given the amount of literature discussing 
the attributes of these specific drugs. The persistence of inappropriate prescribing raises 
questions as to why physicians fail to prescribe safer alternatives such as acetaminophen 
for pain. Some doctors may be unaware of the risks, while others may trust their own 
assessment of the patient’s risk over the literature. Also, drugs such as propoxyphene and 
diazepam may be addictive for some patients (Medical Economics Company Inc., 2005), 
contributing to persistent demand. The implication is that policymakers and third-party 
payers need to consider methods of reducing the prevalence of these medications, such as 
drug utilization reviews and more restrictive formularies. 
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One important limitation of this research is that the list of inappropriate medications is a 
few years old and newer drugs on the market may also be inappropriate. To obtain an 
updated list would require a panel of experts, a task which is beyond the focus of this 
paper. Nonetheless, the intent of this paper is to consider whether selected lists of 
medications that have been clearly indicated as inappropriate multiple times in the 
literature are influenced by cost sharing. It is likely that the effect is the same or even 
more dramatic for other inappropriate medications that were not included in the study. 
Another limitation is our inability to measure any direct effects of the physician13. 
Finally, we rely on a broad measurement of cost sharing that integrates co-payments, co-
insurance and deductibles along with out-of pockets payments. Disentangling the specific 
effect of different cost sharing mechanisms stands out as a useful exercise to carry out. 
One caveat we cannot rule out is that retail price of inappropriate drugs might be different 
from that of appropriate drugs. Another caveat lies in that our measure of co-payment 
might be affected by the individual’s behavior in taking less expensive drugs although, 
we believe that given that the level of cost sharing is to some extent the results of 
individuals choice, both the co-payment and the low drug choice is likely to be the results 
of the same latent variable measuring scarcity. Finally, our results do not tell us whether 
the effect on inappropriate use of medications comes from physician prescribing, 
pharmacist dispensing or patient use of drugs, this is hence a question for further analysis 
to carry out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Had the MEPS database included information on the doctor, we could have tested whether the interaction 
between the physician’s prescription decision and the patient’s consumption decision based on the price 
was significant.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations 
 
Explanatory variable Definition Mean Standard error 
prescription drug co-
payment 
the average amount per prescription paid out-of-pocket by 
the patient 22.393 0.137 
age the age of the respondent 74.375 0.036 
male the respondent was a man 0.409 0.003 
married the individual was married 0.521 0.003 
black the individual reported being black 0.124 0.002 
hispanic the individual reported being Hispanic 0.118 0.002 
other race/ethnicity the individual reported being of another race or ethnicity than white, black, or Hispanic 0.031 0.001 
disposable income the amount of income remaining after total out-of-pocket prescription drug costs are subtracted out 16991 104 
high school degree the individual reported having a high school degree but not a higher degree 0.449 0.003 
above high school 
degree 
the individual reported having some education beyond high 
school 0.186 0.002 
urban area the individual reported living in an urban area 0.745 0.002 
poor health the individual is reported to be in poor health 0.082 0.002 
fair health the individual is reported to be in fair health 0.192 0.002 
good health the individual is reported to be in good health 0.329 0.003 
morbidity 
the individual has been diagnosed with at least one of these 
diseases: asthma, coronary heart disease, stroke, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, malignant cancer, and 
diabetes 
0.380 0.003 
limitation to activities 
of daily living 
the individual faces at least one limitation to an activity of 
daily living 0.083 0.002 
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Table 2. Inappropriate prescription patterns 
 
Explanatory variable Percent of sample with at least one prescription 
Percent of sample with at least one 
inappropriate prescriptiona 
drug copay < $6.36 N/A 19.67 
drug copay, $6.36 - $15.78 N/A 21.37 
drug copay, $15.78 - $31.63 N/A 21.11 
drug copay > $31.63 N/A 17.84 
age <=75 87.99 19.98 
age, 76 – 85 91.53 20.04 
age > 85 91.95 20.29 
male 87.43 16.50 
female 91.17 22.38 
married 89.69 18.46 
not married 89.58 21.75 
white 90.72 20.24 
black 88.56 20.39 
hispanic 85.87 18.53 
other race/ethnicity 83.09 19.18 
disposable income < $6,161 90.94 22.88 
disposable income, $6,161 - $11,173 89.34 20.95 
disposable income, $11,173 - $21,658 89.14 19.53 
disposable income > $21,658 89.14 16.72 
less than high school degree 88.60 22.34 
high school degree 89.97 19.60 
above high school degree 90.89 16.64 
urban area 89.32 18.66 
non-urban area 90.58 18.66 
poor health 96.26 32.17 
fair health 95.97 25.32 
good health 90.85 19.57 
very good or excellent health 84.22 14.69 
morbidity 97.73 23.10 
no morbidity 84.68 17.87 
limitation to activity of daily living 95.82 29.77 
no limitation to activity of daily living 89.08 19.08 
year is 1996 87.52 24.42 
year is 1997 86.71 25.32 
year is 1998 88.14 22.45 
year is 1999 88.77 19.22 
year is 2000 88.97 19.26 
year is 2001 89.61 18.73 
year is 2002 90.71 19.21 
year is 2003 91.08 18.81 
year is 2004 92.09 17.05 
year is 2005 91.34 17.79 
acalculated on the sample with at least one prescription drug 
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Figure 1. Percent of inappropriate prescriptions, 1996-2005 
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Table 3. Determinants of inappropriate prescription drug use, simple probit 
 
Explanatory variable Coefficient (S.E) Marginal effect (S.E) 
prescription drug co-payment -0.030
§             
(0.010) 
-0.008§            
(0.003) 
age 75-84 -0.053
§             
(0.022) 
-0.014§            
(0.006) 
age >84 -0.091
§             
(0.036) 
-0.024§             
(0.009) 
male -0.218
§             
(0.023) 
-0.059§            
(0.006) 
married -0.043*             (0.023) 
-0.012*             
(0.006) 
black -0.092
§            
(0.033) 
-0.024§             
(0.009) 
hispanic -0.166
§            
(0.035) 
-0.043§            
(0.009) 
other race/ethnicity -0.036            (0.062) 
-0.010             
(0.016) 
(log) disposable income -0.008
§            
(0.004) 
-0.002§             
(0.001) 
high school degree -0.023             (0.024) 
-0.006             
(0.007) 
above high school degree -0.049             (0.032) 
-0.013             
(0.008) 
urban area -0.144
§            
(0.023) 
-0.041§             
(0.007) 
poor health 0.490
§             
(0.036) 
0.156§            
(0.013) 
fair health 0.335
§             
(0.026) 
0.099***             
(0.008) 
good health 0.179
§             
(0.022) 
0.050§            
(0.006) 
morbidity 0.128
§          
(0.020) 
0.035§             
(0.006) 
limitation to activity of daily 
living 
0.156§           
(0.034) 
0.045§            
(0.010) 
year is 1997 0.016             (0.031) 
0.004             
(0.009) 
year is 1998 -0.081*            
(0.042) 
-0.022§           
(0.011) 
year is 1999 -0.162
§            
(0.043) 
-0.042§           
(0.010) 
year is 2000 -0.166
§             
(0.042) 
-0.043§            
(0.010) 
year is 2001 -0.186
§             
(0.040) 
-0.048§            
(0.009) 
year is 2002 -0.181
§             
(0.038) 
-0.047§             
(0.009) 
year is 2003 -0.196
§            
(0.040) 
-0.050§             
(0.009) 
year is 2004 -0.259
§             
(0.040) 
-0.065§             
(0.009) 
year is 2005 -0.226
§             
(0.040) 
-0.057§           
(0.009) 
constant -0.498
§             
(0.062) 
 
   
N 29,351  
Log-pseudolikelihood -14,197  
Wald statistic 732.7  
Prob > χ2 0.000  
§significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level,  
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Table 4. Determinants of inappropriate prescription drug use, alternative 
specifications 
 
Explanatory variable Probit with selection:  Coefficient (S.E) 
Probit with endogenous 
co-payment:  
Coefficient (S.E) 
Fixed effects logit:  
Coefficient (S.E) 
prescription drug co-payment -0.049
§             
(0.010) 
-0.066             
(0.095) 
0.089*             
(0.052) 
age 75-84 -0.062
§             
(0.023) 
-0.052**             
(0.023) 
-0.214             
(0.231) 
age >84 -0.103
§             
(0.037) 
-0.087**             
(0.038) 
0.219            
(0.395) 
male -0.200
§             
(0.028) 
-0.226§             
(0.031)  
married -0.051
§             
(0.023) 
-0.040*             
(0.024)  
black -0.085
§            
(0.034) 
-0.100§             
(0.040)  
hispanic -0.149
§             
(0.038) 
-0.177§             
(0.045)  
other race/ethnicity -0.012             (0.064) 
-0.050             
(0.073)  
(log) disposable income -0.010
§             
(0.004) 
-0.009§             
(0.004) 
-0.013            
(0.020) 
high school degree -0.027             (0.024) 
-0.017             
(0.028)  
above high school degree -0.062*             (0.033) 
-0.043             
(0.037)  
urban area -0.141
§             
(0.023) 
-0.146§             
(0.024) 
-0.067             
(0.394) 
poor health 0.447
§             
(0.048) 
0.488§             
(0.036) 
0.369§             
(0.173) 
fair health 0.289
§            
(0.044) 
0.333§             
(0.027) 
0.155             
(0.127) 
good health 0.153
§             
(0.030) 
0.179§             
(0.022) 
0.257§             
(0.099) 
morbidity 0.075*             
(0.044) 
0.129§             
(0.021) 
0.180            
(0.151) 
limitation to activity of daily 
living 
0.146§            
(0.034) 
0.152§            
(0.036) 
0.137             
(0.184) 
year is 1997 0.023             (0.031) 
0.020            
(0.033) 
0.219*             
(0.116) 
year is 1998 -0.077*             
(0.042) 
-0.075*             
(0.045) 
0.044            
(0.197) 
year is 1999 -0.161
§             
(0.042) 
-0.155§             
(0.047) 
-0.150             
(0.256) 
year is 2000 -0.165
§             
(0.042) 
-0.156§             
(0.049) 
0.031             
(0.294) 
year is 2001 -0.186
§             
(0.039) 
-0.175§             
(0.049) 
0.067             
(0.333) 
year is 2002 -0.185
§            
(0.039) 
-0.170§            
(0.048) 
0.069             
(0.352) 
year is 2003 -0.199
§            
(0.040) 
-0.182§             
(0.055) 
0.058             
(0.376) 
year is 2004 -0.267
§            
(0.040) 
-0.250§             
(0.048) 
-0.090             
(0.396) 
year is 2005 -0.234
§             
(0.040) 
-0.219§             
(0.045) 
0.199             
(0.416) 
constant -0.337
§             
(0.098) 
-0.398             
(0.277) 
 
    
N 29,351 29,351 3,741 
Log-pseudolikelihood -23,656 -53,524 -1,280 
Wald or LR χ2 statistic 469.91 729.3 33.41 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.022 
§significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level,  
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Table 5. Robustness checks of the simple probit model for inappropriate 
prescription drug use 
 
Price elasticity -0.029
§ 
(0.008) 
-0.027§ 
(0.008) 
-0.034§ 
(0.008) 
-0.030§ 
(0.008) 
-0.024§ 
(0.008) 
-0.024§ 
(0.008) 
Income elasticity - -0.045
§ 
(0.010) 
-0.040§ 
(0.010) 
-0.017§ 
(0.010) 
-0.020§ 
(0.010) 
-0.020§ 
(0.010) 
prescription drug co-
payment variable ? ? ? ? ? ? 
age variables ? ? ? ? ? ? 
gender variable ? ? ? ? ? ? 
marital status variable ? ? ? ? ? ? 
race/ethnicity variables ? ? ? ? ? ? 
income variable  ? ? ? ? ? 
education variables  ? ? ? ? ? 
urban area variable   ? ? ? ? 
health variables    ? ? ? 
year variables     ? ? 
retirement variable     ?  
mental health variable      ? 
constant ? ? ? ? ? ? 
§significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Interaction effect between the co-payment and insurance coverage 
 
Type of health insurance 
coverage Price elasticity 
Non-Medicare public  -0.021§ 
Private -0.029§ 
Medicare only -0.029§ 
§significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level,  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Medications considered in the analysis and the reasons for their 
inclusion 
 
Medication Reason for Inappropriateness 
Always avoid 
 barbiturates Are highly addictive and cause more side effects than most other sedative or hypnotic drugs in the elderly. 
 flurazepam Has a long half-life in the elderly, producing prolonged sedation and increasing the risk of falls and fractures. 
 meprobomate A highly addictive and sedating antiolytic. 
 chlorpropamide 
Has a long half-life in the elderly and can cause prolonged and seious hypoglycemia. It is the only 
oral hypoglycemic agent that causes syndrome of inappropriate antidiuretic hormone secretion 
(SIADH) 
 meperidine May cause confusion, is not an effective oral analgesic, and has many disadvantages compared to other narcotic drugs. 
 pentazocine Causes central nervous system side effects more commonly than other narcotic drugs. Is also a mixed antagonist and antagonist. 
 trimethobenzamide One of the least effective antiemetic medications, yet it can cause extrapyramidal side effects. 
 belladonna alkaloids 
Gastrointestinal antispasmodic drugs are anticholinergic and generally produce toxic effects in the 
elderly. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the elderly is questionable. 
 dicyclomine Gastrointestinal antispasmodic drugs are anticholinergic and generally produce toxic effects in the elderly. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the elderly is questionable. 
 hyoscymine Gastrointestinal antispasmodic drugs are anticholinergic and generally produce toxic effects in the elderly. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the elderly is questionable. 
 propantheline Gastrointestinal antispasmodic drugs are anticholinergic and generally produce toxic effects in the elderly. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the elderly is questionable. 
Sometimes avoid 
 chlordiazepoxide Has a long half-life in the elderly, producing prolonged sedation and increasing the risk of falls and fractures. 
 diazepam Has a long half-life in the elderly, producing prolonged sedation and increasing the risk of falls and fractures. 
 propoxyphene Offers few analgesic advantages over acetaminophen, yet has the adverse effects of other narcotic drugs. 
 carisoprodol 
Most muscle relaxants and antispasmodic drugs are poorly tolerated by the elderly, leading to 
anticholinergic side effects, sedation, and weakness. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the 
elderly is questionable. 
 chlorzoxazone 
Most muscle relaxants and antispasmodic drugs are poorly tolerated by the elderly, leading to 
anticholinergic side effects, sedation, and weakness. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the 
elderly is questionable. 
 cyclobenzaprine 
Most muscle relaxants and antispasmodic drugs are poorly tolerated by the elderly, leading to 
anticholinergic side effects, sedation, and weakness. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the 
elderly is questionable. 
 metaxalone 
Most muscle relaxants and antispasmodic drugs are poorly tolerated by the elderly, leading to 
anticholinergic side effects, sedation, and weakness. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the 
elderly is questionable. 
 methocarbamol 
Most muscle relaxants and antispasmodic drugs are poorly tolerated by the elderly, leading to 
anticholinergic side effects, sedation, and weakness. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the 
elderly is questionable. 
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Medication Reason for Inappropriateness 
Some indications 
 amitriptyline Rarely the antidepressant of choice for the elderly because of its strong anticholinergic and sedating properties. 
 doxepin Rarely the antidepressant of choice for the elderly because of its strong anticholinergic and sedating properties. 
 indomethacin Produces the most central nervous system adverse effects of all the available nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. 
 dipyridamole Frequently causes orthostatic hypotension in the elderly and has been proven beneficial only in patients with artificial heart valves. 
 ticlopidine Is no better than aspirin in preventing clotting and is considerably more toxic. 
 methyldopa May cause bracycardia and exacerbate depression in the elderly. 
 reserpine Imposes risks such as depression, impotence, sedation, and orthostatic hypotension. 
 disopyramide The most potent negative inotrope of all antiarrhythmic drugs and may induce heart failure in the elderly. Also, it is stronly anticholinergic. 
 oxybutynin 
Most muscle relaxants and antispasmodic drugs are poorly tolerated by the elderly, leading to 
anticholinergic side effects, sedation, and weakness. Their effectiveness at doses tolerated by the 
elderly is questionable. 
 chlorpheniramine Many antihistamines have potent anticholinergic properties. 
 cyproheptadine Many antihistamines have potent anticholinergic properties. 
 diphenhydramine Many antihistamines have potent anticholinergic properties. 
 hydroxyzine Many antihistamines have potent anticholinergic properties. 
 promethazine Many antihistamines have potent anticholinergic properties. 
Source: Beers et al (1991) 
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The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey is publicly available from the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/. The 
database consists of a number of linkable files with the main file being the Household 
Component (HC). The HC contains information about demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, health status and conditions, utilization of medical care 
services, charges and payments for medical care, access to care, and health insurance 
coverage. The Medical Provider Component (MPC) of MEPS is also appropriate as 
this portion of the survey contains information collected from medical providers and 
pharmacies identified by HC respondents. The MPC comprises information on the 
medical and financial characteristics of reported medical and pharmacy events. To 
construct the database, we merged three MEPS files: a database of full-year 
population characteristics, a database of medical conditions, and a database of 
prescription events.  
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Table A2. Data information table 
 
Variable Information 
inappropriate drug use 
Consumption of each of the 33 potentially inappropriate drugs was calculated for each 
individual in the sample. If the individual consumed at least one of these 33 drugs during a 
given year, the dummy variable indicating inappropriate drug use was given the value of 
“1”. If he did not consume any inappropriate medications during a given year, the dummy 
variable was given the value of “0” 
prescription drug co-payment 
The total out-of-pocket cost of all prescriptions that an individual consumes is given in the 
MEPS database. The total number of prescriptions (including initial prescriptions and 
refills) is also given in the MEPS database. The prescription drug co-payment was 
calculated by dividing the total out-of-pocket prescription cost by the total number of 
prescriptions consumed in a given year.  
age The age variable is given in the MEPS database.  
male The gender variable is given in the MEPS database 
married 
The marital status variable is given in the MEPS database and broken into 6 categories: 
married, widowed, divorced, separated, never married, or under 16 and not applicable. If 
the individual reported being married, the married variable was given a value of “1”. For 
all other categories of the marital status variable, the married variable was given a value of 
“0”. 
black If the individual reports being black but not Hispanic, this variable is coded “1” and “0” otherwise. 
hispanic If the individual reports being Hispanic, this variable is coded “1” and “0” otherwise. 
other race/ethnicity If the individual reports being of another race or ethnicity, this variable is coded “1” and “0” otherwise. 
disposable income 
The total income in a given year for the respondent adjusted for inflation (using the 
Consumer Price Index). The total out-of-pocket medical expenses for the respondent 
(adjusted for inflation) is then subtracted from this. 
high school degree This variable takes a value of “1” if the individual reports having a high school diploma or GED equivalent. The variable takes the value of “0” otherwise.  
above high school degree This variable takes a value of “1” if the individual reports having a Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, doctoral degree, or other degree. It takes the value of “0” otherwise. 
urban area If the respondent reports living in an urban area, this variable takes the value of “1” and “0” otherwise. 
poor health If the respondent reports being in poor health, this variable takes the value of “1” and “0” otherwise. 
fair health If the respondent reports being in fair health, this variable takes the value of “1” and “0” otherwise. 
good health If the respondent reports being in good health, this variable takes the value of “1” and “0” otherwise. 
morbidity 
Using the medical conditions file of MEPS, individuals with asthma, coronary heart 
disease, stroke, coronary obstructive pulmonary disease, malignant cancer, and diabetes 
were identified as these are the leading causes of death according to the CDC (2006). This 
information was then merged with the main population characteristics MEPS file. If the 
individual reported having at least one of these medical conditions, the morbidity variable 
was given a value of “1”. If the individual did not report having any of these medical 
conditions, the morbidity variable was given a value of “0”. 
limitation to activities of daily 
living 
If the individual reported having at least one limitation to an activity of daily living (a 
variable that was given in the MEPS database), this variable took a value of “1” and “0” 
otherwise. 
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Table A3. Determinants of positive prescription drug use 
 
Explanatory variable Coefficient (S.E) 
age 75-84 0.160
§            
(0.027) 
age >84 0.205
§             
(0.046) 
male -0.294
§            
(0.026) 
married 0.133
§             
(0.027) 
black -0.163
§            
(0.039) 
hispanic -0.289
§             
(0.039) 
other race/ethnicity -0.373
§             
(0.061) 
(log) disposable income 0.014
§             
(0.005) 
high school degree 0.120
§             
(0.029) 
above high school degree 0.259
§             
(0.038) 
urban area -0.040             (0.029) 
poor health 0.609
§            
(0.056) 
fair health 0.685
§             
(0.038) 
good health 0.314
§            
(0.024) 
morbidity 0.917
§            
(0.033) 
limitation to activity of daily 
living 
0.182§             
(0.057) 
year is 1997 -0.071
§            
 (0.035) 
year is 1998 -0.020             (0.049) 
year is 1999 0.051            (0.049) 
year is 2000 0.073            (0.048) 
year is 2001 0.098
§            
(0.046) 
year is 2002 0.157
§             
(0.045) 
year is 2003 0.171
§             
(0.047) 
year is 2004 0.240
§            
(0.048) 
year is 2005 0.184
§            
(0.048) 
constant 0.579
§            
(0.067) 
  
N 32,744 
Log-pseudolikelihood -9,468 
Wald statistic 1,601 
Prob > χ2 0.000 
§significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level,  
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